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RETHINKING THE ADEQUACY OF INFORMAL 
PROPERTY RULES: SOME EVIDENCE FROM 
MAINE’S LOBSTER FISHERY 
Avi Perry* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of fifteen years, James Acheson compiled a wealth 
of information on the lobstering communities dotting the central Maine 
coast from Bailey Island to Brooksville.  In The Lobster Gangs of Maine, 
Acheson detailed the workings and traditions of these communities, 
paying particular attention to the “thick and complex web of social 
relationships”1 undergirding them and to their methods of allocating 
access to the lobster fishery through informal exclusion mechanisms.  
Since its publication in 1988, Acheson’s study has been hailed as 
documenting “a noteworthy example of long-lasting, informal property 
rights in action.”2  The study has assumed a place within the body of 
legal scholarship arguing that de facto property regimes can develop 
organically outside of the state’s formal legal apparatus, and has been 
understood to support Robert Ellickson’s hypothesis that “informal social 
networks are capable of creating rules that establish property rights.”3   
Within a “close-knit group,” informal property rules, such as 
Acheson catalogs among Maine’s lobstermen, are believed to constrain 
private behavior to the same extent as formal laws and serve to 
“maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday 
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 1. JAMES ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 2 (1988) [hereinafter LOBSTER 
GANGS].   
 2. Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 24 (2002). 
 3. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
203 (1991).   
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affairs with one another.”4  These informal rules have been credited with 
helping such groups to avoid what Garrett Hardin termed “the tragedy of 
the commons”5 by creating locally-appropriate norms that are treated as 
binding by members of the group.6  A number of legal scholars have 
offered laudatory analyses of such informal property systems.  Jonathan 
Macey, for instance, has written that, where operable, “private ordering 
generates substantive legal principles that are superior to those that the 
state produces.”7  And, on the basis of an indigenous Cree subsistence 
fishery, Fikret Berkes has concluded that “[the] ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ model, with its negative prognosis, has been replaced by 
theories based on the idea that resource users are capable of self-
organization and self-regulation.”8 
To this point, excludability has been regarded as the central 
weakness of such informal systems.9  That is, the threat has been 
characterized as external: outsiders who fail to understand or abide by 
the common rules must be kept out, or the system must be incorporated 
within a formal legal framework.  However, recent developments within 
Maine’s lobster fishery suggest an equally serious weakness based on an 
internal threat: under unusual financial stress, members of even a close-
knit group may cease to honor informal property rules, necessitating the 
intervention of state enforcement mechanisms.  This finding challenges 
and contributes to the evolution of commons theory, suggesting that 
exceptions to Hardin’s model may function only under positive 
economic conditions. 
My goal in this brief Comment is modest. I seek only to offer some 
limited evidence to complicate the conventional understanding of 
informal property regimes.  I accomplish this by discussing the Maine 
lobster fishery, as described by James Acheson, and showing how that 
                                                          
 4. Id. at 167.  Jonathan Macey argues that it is “repeated interactions, not the closely 
knit nature of the groups, that leads to cooperation.”  Jonathan R. Macey, Public and 
Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1131 (1997). 
 5. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968).  
Although Hardin discussed commons, today the problem is recognized as being open 
access.  See Fikret Berkes, Revising the Commons Paradigm, 1 J. NAT. RESOURCES POL’Y 
RES. 261, 263 (2009) (“One important conclusion from post-Hardinian work is that 
common property is not the same as open access, and there is nothing inherent in 
commons that leads to resource degradation.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 24.   
 7. Macey, supra note 4, at 1140.   
 8. Birkes, supra note 5, at 261. 
 9. See Adler, supra note 2, at 26.   
2010] Maine’s Lobster Fishery 87 
 
case study has reacted to economic stresses in ways largely unanticipated 
by Acheson.  A radical transformation is taking place in how Maine 
lobstermen protect their property rights, indicating that informal property 
regimes are more fragile than previously realized.  Of course, a single 
stone does not a castle break, and I recognize that the record remains too 
thin to signal a general breakdown in informal property regimes.  
Nevertheless, Acheson’s work is representative of the post-Hardinian 
genre, and—as described below—both anecdotal and documentary 
evidence show that his thesis is misconceived. 
II. TERRITORIALITY IN THE MAINE LOBSTER FISHERY 
A prefatory word about lobsters and the business of trapping them: 
lobstering is a seasonal and highly variable industry.  During the early 
summer, when lobsters molt and seek cover in rocks and kelp beds, 
lobstering is poor and catches fall precipitously.10  Late summer and 
early fall is peak lobstering season, and competition among lobstermen is 
fierce.11  Despite the superabundance of lobster, prices historically have 
been high during peak season, reflecting the annual influx of bib-wearing 
tourists into Maine.12 
Built for maneuverability between traps, of which a single 
lobsterman might set hundreds, lobsterboats are made of wood or 
fiberglass and average between thirty-three and thirty-eight feet in 
length.  Traps are constructed of wood or, increasingly, wire, and are 
attached to Styrofoam buoys floating on the surface by a nylon or 
polypropylene rope (“warp”).13  Because lobsters tend to congregate in 
shallow, coastal waters at depths of less than one hundred and fifty feet, 
lobstermen rarely venture far from shore.14  In addition, because lobsters 
are sedentary creatures, inhabiting a relatively circumscribed area of 
ocean bottom, lobstermen always protect their territory and its quarry 
vigilantly.15  Working alone or with a sternman, it is not unusual for a 
lobsterman to spend his entire working life fishing the same small stretch 
of ocean. 
                                                          
 10. LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 15.   
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. JAMES ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE 
THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY 14 (2003) [hereinafter CAPTURING THE COMMONS].   
 14. Id. at 15. 
 15. Id.; Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence 
from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83-84 (1989) (arguing that informal 
property norms tend to reflect the particular traits of the resource in question). 
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By law, Maine’s fishing grounds are a public resource.16  Anyone 
with a state-issued lobstering permit enjoys the legal right to fish nearly 
anywhere along Maine’s thirty-five hundred mile coastline.  Nonetheless, 
newcomers to the clannish lobstering industry must abide by unwritten 
rules dictating the locations where traps may be set.  They either must 
inherit ocean “bottom” from a family member or establish territory 
through trial and error—often a costly and time-consuming process. 
The territorial nature of Maine’s lobster fishery dates from at least 
the 1890s and has remained unchanged along much of the coast.  The 
lobstermen in each cove or harbor defend their local waters from 
predation by outsiders, thereby regulating access to the open ocean.17  
There may be an unofficial kingpin or boss in each harbor, but decisions 
about who can set traps and where often are made by committee in fish 
shacks or community centers.  In that sense, harbor gangs (to borrow 
Acheson’s term) are both democratic and insular, with membership and 
its corresponding privileges controlled tightly.  Indeed, whatever the 
state’s formal laws, the informal right to fish commercially for lobsters is 
a closely-guarded one, neither alienable nor easily transferable.  In 
Acheson’s view, “the territorial system is the root institution governing 
the lobster industry, making possible the generation of other kinds of rule 
systems.”18 
Within, but especially between harbor gangs, there is ongoing 
competition among lobstermen for prime fishing territory.19  Neighboring 
gangs demarcate abutting territories carefully and by reference to 
specific (often underwater) markers.  By and large, boundaries are taken 
very seriously; “[f]ishermen who place their traps in the territory of 
another gang can expect swift retribution.”20  Acheson describes the 
retribution process as a covert but effective one: 
The violator is usually warned, sometimes by verbal threats and 
abuse, but usually by surreptitious molestation of lobstering gear.  
Two half-hitches of rope may be tied around the spindle of the 
buoy, or legal-sized lobsters may be taken out and the doors of 
the trap left open . . . .  If the violations persist, the traps are 
destroyed . . . .  Usually, however, the offending traps are cut off 
. . . .  There is no practical way to protect traps in the water . . . .  
                                                          
 16. John Richardson, Keeping Peace on the Water Depends on Uneasy Mix of State 
Law, Local Rules, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 26, 2009, at A1. 
 17. See LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 3.   
 18. CAPTURING THE COMMONS, supra note 13, at 221.   
 19. See LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 51-66.    
 20. Id. at 49. 
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Destruction of traps does not usually lead to direct confrontation 
since the owner can only guess who destroyed them or even 
whether they were destroyed on purpose.21 
While acknowledging that, “once in a while,” territorial disputes can 
explode into “full-scale ‘cut war[s],’” Acheson expresses confidence that 
the informal rules generally fare well and lobstermen police their own 
behavior adequately.22  He writes, “the norms are widely obeyed . . . .  
Victims may growl and threaten but they rarely report the incident to any 
law enforcement agency.”23  Until fairly recently, Acheson’s description 
held up to scrutiny. 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
From the mid-1940s to the late 1980s, Maine lobster catches were 
very stable, hovering around twenty million pounds annually.24  In the 
1990s, the catch began to increase rapidly, totaling nearly fifty-seven 
million pounds by 2000.25  By 2003, Acheson could write, “at the 
present, the lobster industry is experiencing a boom.  Catches have never 
been so high at any period.”26  This increase is attributable to a number of 
factors.  First, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of traps being 
set.  In 1950, there were 430,000 traps set in Maine waters; by 2000, 
there were 2,780,000.27  Second, technological advances have improved 
the efficiency of lobstering techniques.28  Today, lobstermen regularly 
make use of hydraulic trap haulers, depth finders, Loran C radio 
navigation, and GPS systems.  Third, there has been modest growth in 
the number of licenses issued by the state.  In 1950, Maine issued 5152 
lobstering licenses, compared with 6884 in 2000.29  Fourth, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that reporting rates may be higher today.  Finally, and 
most contentiously, conservation strategies implemented by federal, 
                                                          
 21. Id. at 74. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 75. 
 24. See CAPTURING THE COMMONS, supra note 13, at 16.   
 25. See id. at 16. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 17. 
 28. See id. at 18. 
 29. See id. at 16-18. 
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state, and local authorities, as well as by lobstermen themselves, may 
have protected the fishery from overexploitation.30 
At the same time, lobster prices have slumped.  Because of market 
fluctuations and basic supply/demand principles, a good catch does not 
always mean a good income.  Particularly during an economic downturn, 
consumers may “view lobsters as a luxury they can do without,” driving 
prices unusually low.31  Preliminary data from the Maine Department of 
Marine Resources comparing 2007 and 2008 show that the value of the 
annual commercial lobster catch dropped nearly forty million dollars, 
from $283,697,544 in 2007 to $244,195,068 in 2008.32  During that time, 
the average price per pound declined nearly one dollar, from $4.43 to 
$3.50.33  Unofficial sources confirm that the price fell even further in 
2009.  By midsummer, the price per pound was roughly $2.25, making 
Maine lobster “less expensive than hot dogs.”34  Compounding the 
economic pressure on lobstermen, the cost of diesel fuel has climbed in 
recent years, and baitfish—such as herring—has doubled in price since 
2007.35 
What has been called “the steepest price decline in generations” is 
being blamed for a recent spate of illegal activity among lobstermen.36  
One Portland newspaper reported: “authorities say that desperation may 
play a role in what they say has been an above-average number of 
incidents of criminal mischief occurring along the coast this summer, 
such as cut trap lines and vandalized boats.”37  As described above, 
Maine lobstermen always have resorted to informal (and frequently 
                                                          
 30. See, e.g., Jon Birger, Looking for a Bargain Dinner? Try Lobster, FORTUNE, July 
17, 2009, available at http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/17/news/economy/cheap_lobster_ 
bargain.fortune/index.htm (“The size of the lobster catch is bigger than ever, thanks to 
excellent oversight of the state’s lobster fishery.”). 
 31. Tom Bell, Plummeting Lobster Prices Dragging Coastal Economies Down, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD/ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Aug. 9, 2009, available at 
http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/story.php?id=275839. 
 32. ME. DEP’T OF MARINE RESOURCES, HISTORICAL MAINE FISHERIES LANDING DATA 
1-2 (2009), http://www.maine.gov/dmr/commercialfishing/documents/lobster.annual. 
tbl.pdf.   
 33. Id. 
 34. Birger, supra note 30.  See also Simmi Aujla, With Lobster Prices Low, Things 
Get Ugly in Maine, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2009, at A3. 
 35. Birger, supra note 30.   
 36. Bell, supra note 31.  See also Aujla, supra note 34, at A3 (“Economic pressure on 
the state’s 5,000 active lobstermen may be fueling the tension. With prices for the state’s 
crustaceans at the lowest level since the early 1990s, lobstermen are having trouble 
covering bait, fuel, and equipment costs.”). 
 37. Bell, supra note 31.    
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unlawful) means of protecting their territory, often through intimidation 
and warnings and sometimes through equipment destruction.  By all 
accounts, however, the rash of violent, criminal behavior that swept 
through Maine lobstering communities in the summer of 2009 was 
unprecedented, prompting Major John Fetterman—a thirty-two year 
veteran of the Maine Marine Patrol—to note, “this is an escalation I 
haven’t seen before.”38  Aside from widespread reports of cut trap lines, 
three lobsterboats in Owls Head—a small town north of Rockland—were 
intentionally sunk;39 in Portland Harbor, a lobsterboat was rammed and 
boarded by a rival vessel;40 and, on remote Matinicus Island, one 
lobsterman shot another in the neck over a perceived territorial 
incursion.41  Addressing the connection between this summer’s violence 
and the economic downturn, James Acheson explained, “you’ve got an 
awful lot of people on edge, stressed and anxious [now] . . . .  There’s a 
lot of people with very serious problems, especially younger people who 
have taken out very large loans,” with lobsterboats priced around 
$300,000 and a full complement of traps costing up to $40,000.42 
One consequence of this uptick in criminal activity has been 
increased skepticism about the long-standing territorial system 
established by Maine lobstermen.  The informal property regime lauded 
by Acheson and others has been called into question, as lobstermen have 
proven incapable of policing themselves.  Predictably, the Maine Marine 
Patrol has stepped-up its surveillance efforts.43  More surprisingly, there 
has been a call from within the lobstering community for abandonment 
of the informal territorial system in favor of state enforcement of 
property rights.  Local lobstermen have proposed an official Matinicus 
Island lobstering zone, in which non-residents would be barred from 
                                                          
 38. Aujla, supra note 34, at A3.  See also Abigail Curtis, Man Charged with Trap 
Cutting; Maine Marine Patrol Steps Up Surveillance of Midcoast Lobster Fishing, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Trap Cutting] (“Many in the 
industry and the Marine Patrol said that this summer's string of violent events, which 
some tie to lobster territory disputes, is the worst in recent memory.”). 
 39. Bell, supra note 31.  
 40. Clarke Canfield, Lobster Wars Rock Remote Maine Island, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Sept. 5, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20090904/lobster-
wars/. 
 41. See Aujla, supra note 34, at A3.  Both the shooting and the aforementioned 
sinkings occurred in Knox County, where more lobsters are caught than in any other 
county in the United States.  See Bell, supra note 31.   
 42. Abigail Curtis, Hard Times Stress-out Lobstermen, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7, 
2009, at A1 [hereinafter Hard Times]. 
 43. Trap Cutting, supra note 38, at A1.   
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setting traps.44  One full-time island resident explained, “instead of us 
having to enforce the boundaries, the Marine Patrol would enforce 
them.”45  This demand for more formal property rules and enforcement 
reflects the emergent reality that the present system of informal rules 
cannot function in a poor economic climate, when desperation proves 
stronger than community norms. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
In writing The Lobster Gangs of Maine, Acheson plainly took aim at 
Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” theory, which posited that 
open-access resources will be exploited in the absence of either state 
control or individual ownership.46  By touting the Maine lobster fishery’s 
implementation of a successful communal property arrangement, 
Acheson hoped to show that “tragedies of the commons . . . are not 
inevitable” and, moreover, that “governmental action and private 
property are not the only solutions to resource problems.”47  In contrast to 
Hardin’s top-down approach, Acheson depicted lobstermen as able to 
regulate their own industry—without government interference—through 
the development of informal property rules. 
The flaw in Acheson’s thesis is that it fails to appreciate the full 
effects of devastating economic conditions.  As demonstrated above, 
lobstermen have responded to unprecedented economic stress by 
violating the territorial system and abandoning informal behavioral 
norms, attempting to make ends meet by capturing as much of the 
resource (lobster) as possible.  Frequent, serious reports of equipment 
destruction, territory disputes, and violence during the summer of 2009 
suggest that Acheson’s thesis only holds true in boom times, such as 
those prevailing in 1988, when Acheson wrote The Lobster Gangs of 
Maine, and in 2003, when he followed up with Capturing the Commons.  
Acheson may have anticipated this development somewhat, but he failed 
to account for either its severity or its implications: 
There can be little question that the lobster industry is living in 
unusually good times . . . .  It is tempting to say that as long as 
the existing system is maintained, all will be well . . . .  However 
it is all too easy to imagine changes that could bring disaster too . 
                                                          
 44. See Canfield, supra note 40.    
 45. Id. 
 46. Hardin, supra note 5, at 1243.   
 47. LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 1, at 143.   
2010] Maine’s Lobster Fishery 93 
 
. . .  Economic changes could . . . help to move the system in a 
different direction.48  
Increasingly, informal rules are giving way to formal rules, both on 
the state’s own initiative and at the behest of lobstermen who are hoping 
to avoid a “tragedy of the commons.”  Although sparse, the available 
evidence hints that one of the unforeseen consequences of the current 
economic recession could be the collapse of informal property regimes.  
The evidence points also to a similar result in the event of environmental 
degradation or poor resource management: if climate change or resource 
overuse threatens the stability of particular industries, informal property 
systems in those industries could disintegrate.  To date, those outcomes 
have been staved off by boom times and effective resource management, 
but—unless the economy recovers quickly—Maine’s lobster fishery 
must head towards a more formalized property regime if it is to avoid a 
“tragedy of the commons.”  In short, post-Hardinian commons theory 
may be inapplicable to bust times.  While it is important to gather more 
evidence to substantiate this claim, this proposed connection between the 
economy and property regimes may have important implications for the 
future vitality of Maine’s lobster fishery and the men and women who 
depend upon it. 
                                                          
 48. CAPTURING THE COMMONS, supra note 13, at 234.   
